A CASE FOR RESPONSIBLE NUCLEAR DETTERANCE
16-Jul-2025

By Noel Therattil 

For decades, the conversation around nuclear deterrence has been dominated by the principles of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. A nuclear-weapon-free world is often equated with a safer, more peaceful world. But is that truly the case? Does eliminating nuclear weapons guarantee peace? While it is undeniable that nuclear weapons pose an existential threat, an alternative perspective suggests that stability might be achieved not through complete abolition but by maintaining a credible minimum deterrence (CMD).

Not all nuclear weapons are created equal. They vary in yield, deployment readiness, and strategic purpose. Broadly, nuclear weapons can be categorised into strategic, tactical (non-strategic), and semi-strategic (non-strategic) weapons. Many states do not distinguish between strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons, further complicating arms control discussions.

A common misconception is that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) seeks to ban the production of nuclear weapons entirely. In reality, the NPT primarily aims to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to non-nuclear states for weaponisation. The only clause that addresses disarmament is Article VI, which obligates states to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." However, enforcement remains a challenge, and disarmament efforts have been slow.

 

Today, an estimated 10,000 to 13,000 nuclear weapons remain deployed, significantly lower than the 60,000 that existed at the height of the Cold War. Yet, even at these reduced numbers, nuclear weapons continue to pose a global existential threat.

Nuclear deterrence policies differ among states and often incorporate elements of strategic ambiguity. While such ambiguity may enhance deterrence, it also challenges assessing deterrence capabilities and defining clear "red lines." NATO, for instance, maintains a long-term vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world but acknowledges the security environment in which it operates. NATO states: "Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has dramatically reduced the number, types, and readiness of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and its reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. Against this background and considering the broader security environment, NATO is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area."

Therefore, what initially appears as a case against nuclear weapons, upon closer scrutiny, becomes an argument for the retention of non-strategic nuclear weapons. These weapons are often easier to maintain, more adaptable to specific military needs, and deployable with greater flexibility.

The Cold War doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) created the stability-instability paradox. This principle suggests that while nuclear weapons deter large-scale conflicts between superpowers, their very existence may encourage more minor conflicts below the nuclear threshold, increasing the risk of escalation. This paradox highlights a chilling yet essential aspect of global stability: the sheer destructive power of nuclear weapons creates a threshold that no rational actor dares to cross, thus preventing major wars between nuclear-armed states since World War II.

India’s experience with nuclear deterrence offers a clear example of this paradox in action. Since China’s first nuclear test, India and China have not fought a full-scale war, and since India’s first nuclear test, India and Pakistan have similarly avoided full-scale war. The 2001 Indian Parliament attack and the subsequent Operation Parakram illustrate how nuclear weapons have deterred not only nuclear war but also large-scale conventional war. In response to the attack, India's Cabinet Committee on Security convened, with the Army advocating for "full-scale mobilisation to cater for escalation and a possible nuclear standoff." Both India and Pakistan mobilised troops along the border, yet full-scale war was ultimately averted due to the looming nuclear threat. It is believed that both sides possessed tactical nuclear weapons, which, even in a limited exchange, could have resulted in Hiroshima-scale devastation. However, while nuclear deterrence prevented large-scale war, it also enabled instability by allowing lower-intensity conflicts to persist. During this tense period, another major terrorist attack—targeting families of Indian security personnel in Kashmir—occurred. State-sponsored terrorism, asymmetric attacks, and proxy conflicts thrive in such an environment, as nuclear deterrence constrains full-scale retaliation but does not eliminate hostilities.

Thus, the stability-instability paradox presents a troubling reality: while nuclear weapons may prevent large-scale war, they may simultaneously encourage violent, lower-level conflicts. Despite this risk, some argue that this paradox is preferable to an all-out war between regional or global powers. In this context, we may look at the Russo-Ukrainian war in hindsight. 

For certain states, nuclear weapons serve as a vital security guarantee. Perceived vulnerabilities and external threats often outweigh moral and ethical concerns, reinforcing that nuclear deterrence remains essential for national survival. From a realist perspective, nuclear deterrence is a necessary balance between national security and existential risk. Responsible denuclearisation requires a global consensus on pragmatic, achievable steps. Measures such as adopting "no-first-use" policies, de-alerting nuclear arsenals, and limiting stockpiles offer cautious yet practical ways to make the world safer.

Only once these measures have created a more stable world can we explore fundamental questions: What does true safety mean? What does peace entail? And most importantly, are we ready for a world where nuclear deterrence no longer exists as a safeguard against large-scale conventional wars like those witnessed between 1914 and 1945?

References

Union of Concerned Scientists. (2023, January 25). Nuclear weapons worldwide. Retrieved from https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-weapons-worldwide

NATO. (2012, May 20). Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, 20-May-2012. Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/official/dod/reviews/ddr/2012-deterrence-and-defence-posture-review.pdf

Rajesh Basrur (2019) India’s Pakistan problem: operation Parakram revisited, India Review, 18:5, 503-519, DOI: 10.1080/14736489.2019.1703362

H S Panag (2023, December 29). Operation Parakram: The war that wasn't but could have reined in Pakistan. The Print. Retrieved from https://theprint.in/opinion/operation-parakram-the-war-that-wasnt-but-could-have-reined-in-pakistan/172471/

Stimson Center. (2023, January). Twin Peaks Crisis: Assessing Risks and Potential Responses to North Korea's Escalating Nuclear and Missile Programs. [Stimson Center]. Retrieved from https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/Twin_Peaks_Crisis.pdf